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BOOK NOTES

Terry L. Anderson and Pamela Snyder, Water Markets: Priming the Invisible Pump, The Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., (1997);
228pp; $19.95; ISBN 1-882577-43-4, hardcover.
Water Markets examines the market forces behind the allocation
and consumption of water resources in the United States and is the
culmination of several years of research on the prospects for using
markets to solve water problems. This book builds on Anderson's first
edition of Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought by exploring the
changes in water policy in recent years, and providing alternatives to
the current water policy in this country. The book is well organized
with tables located throughout, notes at the end of each chapter, an
extensive list of authorities, and a comprehensive index.
Chapter One illustrates why a water crisis exists worldwide and specifically in the United States. The authors include references to various studies to show how growing population and declining resource
availability is causing a water crisis. Anderson and Snyder indicate that
government regulation of resources perpetuated the water crisis and a
free market would better preserve our nation's water resources. This
chapter looks at historical trends of water allocation institutions and
the idea of decentralization of those institutions.
The second chapter focuses on the political economy of water policy. The authors compare increased government involvement and traditional water economics approaches to theories extolled by free market environmentalism. They evaluate both approaches based on water
use efficiency, environmental quality and fiscal responsibility. In the
authors' opinion, efficiency results when market processes are applied
to water problems, and decentralization would provide the most efficient and productive system of water allocation.
Chapters Three through Eight examine different aspects of the existing water market. Topics covered include the evolution of water institutions, the interrelation between politics and water, the appropriation doctrine, instream flows, and pollution and ground water deeds.
The authors offer insight on problems that exist with the current policies and propose changes that would produce a more efficient and
longer lasting water market.
The last chapter, "We've Come a Long Way, Baby," concludes the
book by providing the reader a summary of changes in the water market since 1980.
Water Markets is a good informational book for the reader who
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wishes to examine the efficiency of the water market system and understand the economic forces behind the doctrines that control water
policy.
Tracy Rogers

Carraro, Carlo, ed., International Environmental Negotiations: Strategic Policy Issues, Edward Elgar Pub., Brookfield, Vt. (1997);
199 pp; $80.00; ISBN 1-85898-524-2, hardcover.
Most new environmental phenomena are inherently global.
Commodities like air and water are managed as common-property
goods. Since no institution has the power to globally regulate the use
of these resources, it becomes difficult to achieve broad environmental
agreements and necessary to create a method of negotiation that will
lead to self-enforcing agreements.
InternationalEnvironmental Negotiations compiles articles from professors around the world concerning methods of negotiating these selfenforcing agreements. The authors recognize the difficulty in achieving self-enforcing agreements with a large number of signatories; especially where there are significant differences in costs and benefits for
the countries involved. Most of the authors use complicated economic
formulae to analyze self-enforcing agreements, and conclude that a
self-enforcing agreement can only be achieved with a small number of
signatories.
The editor's introduction discusses various attempts to achieve international agreement, such as the 1994 Montreal Protocol on chlorofluorocarbons, and explains the difficulties that may be encountered
in international environmental negotiations. The editor also gives a
brief introduction of the theories and techniques addressed in each
chapter.
Chapter Two explores the economics of self-enforcing agreements
between countries with differing economic and environmental structures. Such self-enforcing agreements are called "heterogeneous international environmental agreements" ("IEAs"). For example, in the
global warming context all countries have different abatement costs
that yield different benefits. Those differing costs and benefits can
have a large impact on sustaining a potentially globally beneficial IEA.
The author notes that two main problems of heterogeneous IEA analysis are: (1) a need for signatories to reach agreement about obligations
and (2) a need to devise "credible punishments" to sustain the agreement.
Chapter Three analyzes burden sharing and coalition stability in
environmental negotiations while taking asymmetries between countries into account. Using this approach, countries must decide
whether to join a coalition given an agreed upon burden-sharing rule.
Each country then sets environmental policy by maximizing its own

